Voilà!, Nicolas, et merci beaucoup,
Voilà! Ça marche maintenant. Merci à Nicolas
Scott
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Thanks so much, Yvain, Anant, Ned, Larry, Nicolas,
I like what I see in checking out the https://studio.app.moocit.fr/course/course-v1:WUAS+001+1 studio. It seems very extensible and flexible in multiple ways. It's also practical. Thank you for this remarkable platform for education.
Am simply keeping you, Anant and Ned, posted in these initial momentous steps for World Univ & Sch into Open edX ... and potentially regarding creating major online universities in all ~200 countries' official and main languages (and in outer space too!), and even wiki schools with courses people could create in all 7,117 known living languages - and in anticipating machine learning, translation and other AI in the Open edX platform.
Will free up your in-boxes for the time being, Anant and Ned - and thank you all so much for these amazing information technologies, and this structure and process that allow potentially for the creation of free universal highest quality online education (wiki, too, - for people-to-people open teaching and learning). It's a bit like the first Mars-walk in 2038 - n'est-ce pas? :)
More soon, Yvain! Thank you.
Cheers, Scott
https://scott-macleod.blogspot.com/2020/07/saxifraga-mertensiana-offer-to-build.html
https://wiki.worlduniversityandschool.org/wiki/Nation_States
https://wiki.worlduniversityandschool.org/wiki/Languages
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Create Web anew: #EthnoWikiVirtualWorldGraphy as ethnographic theory & cultural practice. So many possible dirs. in sociocultural anthropology https://scott-macleod.blogspot.com/search/label/ethno-wiki-virtual-world-graphy Am seeking for all 7.5 billion people to shape #RealisticVirtualEarth Add Harbin Pix: http://tinyurl.com/p62rpcg ~
Create Web anew: #EthnoWikiVirtualWorldGraphy as ethnographic theory & cultural practice. So many possible dirs. in sociocultural anthropology https://t.co/v3gVpAEY1l Am seeking for all 7.5 billion people to shape #RealisticVirtualEarth Add Harbin Pix: https://t.co/dHWQmnrQPY ~— Scott_GK_MacLeod_WUaS_worlduniversityandschool.org (@scottmacleod) July 31, 2020
https://twitter.com/scottmacleod/status/1289230354528649217?s=20
https://twitter.com/WorldUnivAndSch/status/1289252433734955008?s=20
https://twitter.com/HarbinBook/status/1289252798379380737?s=20
https://twitter.com/WUaSPress/status/1289253483539861504?s=20
https://twitter.com/sgkmacleod/status/1289254661283708928?s=20
https://twitter.com/TheOpenBand/status/1289256488817442816?s=20
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Create Web anew: #EthnoWikiVirtualWorldGraphy as ethnographic theory & cultural practice. So many possible dirs. in sociocultural anthropology https://scott-macleod.blogspot.com/search/label/ethno-wiki-virtual-world-graphy Am seeking for all 7.5 billion people to shape #RealisticVirtualHarbin Add Harbin Pix: http://tinyurl.com/p62rpcg ~
Create Web anew: #EthnoWikiVirtualWorldGraphy as ethnographic theory & cultural practice. So many possible dirs. in sociocultural anthropology https://t.co/5p81EFFOza Am seeking for all 7.5 billion people to shape #RealisticVirtualHarbin Add Harbin Pix: https://t.co/8F7i8x7dSD ~— HarbinBook (@HarbinBook) July 31, 2020
https://twitter.com/WUaSPress/status/1289253576716386304?s=20
https://twitter.com/scottmacleod/status/1289254068938928130?s=20
https://twitter.com/sgkmacleod/status/1289254957082767362?s=20
https://twitter.com/TheOpenBand/status/1289256295355179008?s=20
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Friday, July 31, 2020
Could someone be reading my blog possibly? The following from PhilPapers.org about Agency, Consciousness and MUCH more, just popped into my email (and which I'm posting both here - https://scott-macleod.blogspot.com/2020/07/andersons-mountain-crown-agency-have.html (from 7/28/20) - and in today's July 31, 2020 - https://scott-macleod.blogspot.com/2020/07/saxifraga-cespitosa-voila-nicolas-et.html - post):
Jul 31st 2020 GMT
- Where is the Fundamental Disagreement Between Naive Realism and Intentionalism? Takuya Niikawa - 2020 - Metaphilosophy 51 (4):593-610.
- Fully Autonomous AI. Wolfhart Totschnig - forthcoming - Science and Engineering Ethics:1-13.In the fields of artificial intelligence and robotics, the term “autonomy” is generally used to mean the capacity of an artificial agent to operate independently of human guidance. It is thereby assumed that the agent has a fixed goal or “utility function” with respect to which the appropriateness of its actions will be evaluated. From a philosophical perspective, this notion of autonomy seems oddly weak. For, in philosophy, the term is generally used to refer to a stronger capacity, namely the capacity to “give oneself the law,” to decide by oneself what one’s goal or principle of action will be. The predominant view in the literature on the long-term prospects and risks of artificial intelligence is that an artificial agent cannot exhibit such autonomy because it cannot rationally change its own final goal, since changing the final goal is counterproductive with respect to that goal and hence undesirable. The aim of this paper is to challenge this view by showing that it is based on questionable assumptions about the nature of goals and values. I argue that a general AI may very well come to modify its final goal in the course of developing its understanding of the world. This has important implications for how we are to assess the long-term prospects and risks of artificial intelligence.
- What Inference to the Best Explanation Is Not: A Response to Roche and Sober's Screening-Off Challenge to IBE. Marc Lange - 2020 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 39:27-42.
- Brain-to-Brain Coupling in the Gamma-Band as a Marker of Shared Intentionality. Paulo Barraza, Alejandro Pérez & Eugenio Rodríguez - 2020 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 14.
- Throwing Spatial Light: On Topological Explanations in Gestalt Psychology. Bartłomiej Skowron & Krzysztof Wójtowicz - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-22.It is a well-known fact that mathematics plays a crucial role in physics; in fact, it is virtually impossible to imagine contemporary physics without it. But it is questionable whether mathematical concepts could ever play such a role in psychology or philosophy. In this paper, we set out to examine a rather unobvious example of the application of topology, in the form of the theory of persons proposed by Kurt Lewin in his Principles of Topological Psychology. Our aim is to show that this branch of mathematics can furnish a natural conceptual system for Gestalt psychology, in that it provides effective tools for describing global qualitative aspects of the latter’s object of investigation. We distinguish three possible ways in which mathematics can contribute to this: explanation, explication and metaphor. We hold that all three of these can be usefully characterized as throwing light on their subject matter, and argue that in each case this contrasts with the role of explanations in physics. Mathematics itself, we argue, provides something different from such explanations when applied in the field of psychology, and this is nevertheless still cognitively fruitful.
Jul 30th 2020 GMT
- Agency in Mental Disorder: Exploring the Connections. Matt King & Joshua May (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.How exactly do mental disorders affect one’s agency? How might therapeutic interventions help patients regain or improve their autonomy? Do only some disorders excuse morally inappropriate behavior, such as theft or child neglect? Or is there nothing about having a disorder, as such, that affects whether we ought to praise or blame someone for their moral success or failure? Our volume gathers together empirically-informed philosophers who are well equipped to tackle such questions. Contributors specialize in free will, agency, and responsibility, but they are informed by current scientific and clinical approaches to a wide range of psychopathologies, including autism, addiction, Capgras delusion, Tourette syndrome, personality disorders, depression, dementia, phobias, schizophrenia, and obsessive-compulsive disorder. These conditions exhibit a diverse array of symptoms that can contribute quite differently to blameworthy or praiseworthy acts.
- The Nature of Truth (Second Edition). Michael Lynch, Jeremy Wyatt, Junyeol Kim & Nathan Kellen (eds.) - forthcoming - MIT Press.
- (Counter)Factual Want Ascriptions and Conditional Belief. Thomas Grano & Milo Phillips-Brown - manuscriptWhat are the truth conditions of want ascriptions? According to a highly influential and fruitful approach, championed by Heim (1992) and von Fintel (1999), the answer is intimately connected to the agent’s beliefs: ⌜S wants p⌝ is true iff within S’s belief set, S prefers the p worlds to the ~p worlds. This approach faces a well-known and as-yet unsolved problem, however: it makes the entirely wrong predictions with what we call '(counter)factual want ascriptions', wherein the agent either believes p or believes ~p—e.g., ‘I want it to rain tomorrow and that is exactly what is going to happen’ or ‘I want this weekend to last forever but of course it will end in a few hours’. We solve this problem. The truth conditions for want ascriptions are, we propose, connected to the agent’s conditional beliefs. We bring out this connection by pursuing a striking parallel between (counter)factual and non-(counter)factual want ascriptions on the one hand and counterfactual and indicative conditionals on the other.
- The Role of Consciousness in Free Action. Philip Woodward - forthcoming - In Joe Campbell, Kristin M. Mickelson & V. Alan White (eds.), Wiley Companion to Free Will. Wiley.It is intuitive that free action depends on consciousness in some way, since behavior that is unconsciously generated is widely regarded as un-free. But there is no clear consensus as to what such dependence comes to, in part because there is no clear consensus about either the cognitive role of consciousness or about the essential components of free action. I divide the space of possible views into four: the Constitution View (on which free actions metaphysically consist, at least in part, in phenomenally conscious episodes of a special sort), the Causal-Dependence View (on which free actions are necessarily caused by conscious episodes), the Counterfactaul-Dependence View (on which free actions necessarily counterfactually dependent on conscious episodes of certain types), and the Independence View (on which there are no necessary dependence-relations that hold between free action and conscious episodes). After surveying recent empirical literature that purports to show that consciousness plays a smaller role in generating action than is usually supposed, I conclude that it is plausible that free action depends on consciousness in two ways. First, free action causally depends on consciousness control. Second, free action counterfactually depends on the agent's being responsive to certain reasons.
- Technological Innovation and Natural Law. Philip Woodward - forthcoming - Philosophia Reformata.I discuss three tiers of technological innovation: mild innovation, or the acceleration by technology of a human activity aimed at a good; moderate innovation, or the obviation by technology of an activity aimed at a good; and radical innovation, or the altering by technology of the human condition so as to change what counts as a good. I argue that it is impossible to morally assess proposed innovations within any of these three tiers unless we rehabilitate a natural-law ethical framework. And I offer some moral starting points within such a framework, in connection with innovations of each of the three types.
- The Selection Problem for Constitutive Panpsychism. Philip Woodward - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.Constitutive panpsychism is the doctrine that macro-level consciousness—that is, consciousness of the sort possessed by certain composite things such as humans—is built out of irreducibly mental (or proto-mental) features had by some or all of the basic physical constituents of reality. On constitutive panpsychism, changes in macro-level consciousness amount to changes in either the way that micro-conscious entities ‘bond’ or the way that micro-conscious qualities ‘blend’ (or both). I pose the ‘Selection Problem’ for constitutive panpsychism: the problem of explaining how high-level functional states of the brain ‘select’ micro-conscious qualities for bonding or blending. I argue that there are no empirically plausible solutions to this problem.
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